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Russia’s Hybrid War Against Europe: The Baltic Region as the First Line of Defense

Russia’s Hybrid War Against Europe: The Baltic Region as the First Line of Defense

Today we can no longer speak of Russia’s hybrid war as a potential threat — it is happening right now. All the elements of this scenario are already in play: sabotage of critical infrastructure, agent recruitment, arson, cyberattacks, electronic warfare, information campaigns, and psychological pressure. This is felt most strongly in the Baltic States and Northern Europe.

Arson and Sabotage — It Has Already Begun

In May 2024, the Marywilska 44 shopping center in Warsaw, Poland, was set on fire, and in Lithuania, an IKEA store in Vilnius was burned down. Investigations confirmed a Russian footprint in both cases. In the UK, warehouses linked to Ukraine were set ablaze, with perpetrators recruited through Telegram channels offering cash and gifts for carrying out tasks.

Equally dangerous are underwater attacks. In December 2024, the tanker Eagle S damaged five undersea cables in the Gulf of Finland, causing tens of millions of euros in damages. This was just one of at least seven recorded incidents of infrastructure damage in the Baltic over recent months.

Open Recruitment of Agents

Russia is actively recruiting citizens of the Baltic States through social media and criminal networks. The scheme is simple: initial “test” tasks, followed by assignments involving information gathering, monitoring facilities, or carrying out sabotage. Lithuanian prosecutors recorded cases where arson was rewarded with €10,000 and a car.

Military Build-Up Near Borders

At the same time, Russia continues to increase its military presence near the Baltic and Finland. This includes not only troop deployments but also infrastructure for rapid offensive operations. Lithuania is responding by building fortifications, placing “dragon’s teeth” tank barriers, and preparing defensive units, but without a comprehensive international strategy, this is not enough.

Electronic Warfare (EW) — A Silent Threat to Civil Aviation

From the Kaliningrad region, Russia operates powerful electronic warfare systems capable of jamming GPS and other navigation signals over large swaths of the Baltic Sea and surrounding airspace.

  • Impact on Civil Aviation: In early 2024 and again in 2025, pilots flying over Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia reported navigation failures and GPS signal loss, forcing reliance on backup systems and visual navigation.

  • Operational Danger: Such interference can cause delays, rerouting, and increased collision risk in congested air corridors, particularly in poor weather conditions.

  • Strategic Purpose: This is not random — it is a form of hybrid aggression meant to test NATO’s readiness, intimidate civilian sectors, and potentially mask military movements. OSINT and aviation data tracking confirm repeated GPS-jamming incidents originating near Kaliningrad, affecting both civilian flights and maritime navigation.

NATO’s Strategic Gaps

Although NATO launched a maritime operation to protect undersea cables, reactions are often too slow. There is no systemic integration of OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) and analytics into decision-making. Airspace violations, GPS jamming, and cyberattacks often go unanswered promptly and publicly.

Outdated Doctrines and Lack of Experienced Professionals

Military and intelligence structures often think in terms of the previous war. There is a shortage of people with real combat and OSINT experience who can analyze unconventional threats. This leads to slow responses and missed opportunities to prevent attacks.

What Needs to Be Done: The Role of OSINT and Analytics

To effectively counter hybrid threats, Europe needs a new approach that includes:

  1. Continuous monitoring of critical infrastructure using open-source data — from satellite imagery and maritime trackers to social media analysis. This can reveal suspicious activity such as unusual ship routes or preparations for sabotage.

  2. Engaging citizens and journalists in early-warning systems. Building platforms where residents can report suspicious activity and analysts can quickly verify the information.

  3. Creating a centralized NATO OSINT center or partnering with the Hybrid CoE to collect and analyze data from all member states around the clock.

  4. Integrating the private sector into security monitoring — partnering with companies that have access to commercial satellite imagery, cybersecurity tools, and maritime analytics.

  5. Training and recruiting specialists with real-world experience — involving veterans, cyber experts, and OSINT analysts who have worked in conflict zones and can quickly adapt to hybrid scenarios.

Conclusion

Hybrid war is already underway. The question is not if but how quickly it will spread to other parts of Europe. The only way to reduce the threat is to act proactively — using data, analytics, and the expertise of those who understand the realities of modern warfare. Electronic warfare, as seen from Kaliningrad’s operations, is just one example of a silent but highly dangerous dimension of this conflict.

 

Author: Serhii Hoptariev, Defense Analyst at NORNSEC